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DIVISIBLE DIVORCE AND SUBTRACTABLE SUPPORT
JOHN

0.

RAMES*

The opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority in
Estin v. Estin,' gave Supreme Court sanction to the now familiar concept
of divisible divorce. The Court held in that case that the alimony provisions of a New York separation decree survived an ex parte divorce subsequently granted to the husband in Nevada. Thus the court neatly
dissolved the Estin marital bonds without severing the family purse strings.
By dividing the divorce, the Court prevented the husband from subtracting
the support previously decreed to the wife in another jurisdiction. It was
noted in the opinion that the result might have been different if the wife
had been personally served, or if she had appeared in the divorce pro2
ceedings.
Our present purpose is to explore the effect of migratory divorces upon
pre-existing alimony or support decrees made in favor of the wife in proceedings for separate maintenance, separation, limited divorce, divorce
a mensa, and the like. The authorities do not indicate that the exact
character or form of such initial proceeding is significant. In the interests
of brevity we shall use the tern "support decree" as including all forms of
decress, orders or judgments for the support of a wife, made in any such initial proceedings. By "migratory" divorces we mean those granted in jurisdictions other than that in which the original support decree was entered.3
"Ex parte" proceedings, as the term will be employed herein, are proceedings
in which there is no personal service of process upon the defendant within
the forum State, nor any appearance by the defendant, either personally
or by attorney, in such proceedings. In our analysis we shall assume that
the support decree is a valid in personam judgment against the husband,
and that the ex parte divorce decree is valid insofar as the dissolution of the
marriage is concerned-referring only incidentally to such jurisdictional
4
problems as were presented by Williams 11.
1.

WHEN THE SUBSEQUENT

DIVORCE Is EX PARTE

Joseph and Gertrude Estin were married in 1937 and lived in New
York as man and wife until April 1942, when Mr. Estin left his wife. In
1943, in a New York State court, Mrs. Estin obtained a judgment of separa1.
2.
3.

*Associate Professor of Law, University of Wyoming.
334 U.s. 541 (1948).
Id. at 544.
F. represents the jurisdiction which has granted a support decree, F, the jurisdiction in which the divorce is subsequently granted. The terminology is adapted
from CHEATHAM, DOWLING, GOODRICU AND GRISWOLD, CASES AND
Cf. Paulsen, Migratory
MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 12 (2d cd. 1942).

4.

Divorce: Chapters III and IV, 24 Ind. L. J. 25 (1948).
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
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tion, which included an award of $180 per month permanent alimony.
In 1944 he went to Nevada, and in 1945 obtained an ex parte divorce
against her in a Nevada court, with no award of alimony, on the grounds
of three years' continual separation without cohabitation-a ground of
divorce not recognized in New York. Thereafter, he discontinued payments under the New York support decree. In 1946, Mrs. Estin sought
a supplementary judgment in the New York proceeding for the amount
of arrears under the support decree. Mr. Estin appeared in the action and
moved to eliminate the alimony provisions of the separation decree by
reason of the Nevada divorce. Thus, the question of the validity and effect
of the Nevada divorce was raised in F 1. The issue of Mr. Estin's bona
fide domicile in Nevada was litigated, in the Williams II manner, and was
found in favor of Mr. Estin. The New York Court of Appeals held that
the Nevada decree was valid to dissolve the marriage, but that it did not
affect the pre-existing support decree. 5 Thus Mrs. Estin was successful in
obtaining her supplementary judgment for arrears of support money.
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed by a majority of
seven to two, Justices Frankfurter and Jackson dissenting.6 In the course
of the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas held that the Full Faith and
Credit clause required only that New York recognize the Nevada decree
as a dissolution of the marriage3 As to its effect upon the prior support
decree, he observed: 8
"Petitioner's argument therefore is that the tail must go with
the hide-that since by the Nevada decree, recognized in New
York, he and respondent are no longer husband and wife, no legal
incidence of the marriage remains. We are given a detailed
analysis of New York law to show that the New York courts have
no power either by statute or by common law to compel a man
to support his ex-wife, that alimony is payable only so long as the
relation of husband and wife exists, that in New York, as in some
other states, see Esenwein v. Pennsylvania, supra, 325 U.S. page
280, 65 S. Ct. 1118, 89 L. Ed. 1608, 157 A.L.R. 1396, a support order
does not survive divorce.
"The difficulty with that argument is that the highest court
in New York has held in this case that a support order can survive
divorce and that this one has survived petitioner's divorce. ' .
The New York court, having jurisdiction over both parties, undertook to protect her by granting her a judgment of permanent
alimony. Nevada, however, apparently follows the rule that dissolution of the marriage puts an end to a support order. See
Herrick v. Herrick, 55 Nev. 59, 68, 25 P.2d 378, 380."
5.

6.
7.
8.

Estin v. Estin, 296 N. Y. 308, 73 N. E. 2d 113 (1947).
The lower New York courts
have continued to follow this rule: Gittleman v. Gittleman, 80 N.Y.S. 2d 695 (1948)
(dictum); Morton v. Morton, 99 N.Y.S. 2d 155 (1950); Duckworth v. Duckworth,
105 N.Y.S. 2d 617 (1951).
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
Id. at 549.
Id. at 544.
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The opinion further reasons that since the wife's right to payments
under the support decree is a property right, it can be extinguished only
by an in personam judgment against her, which could be obtained only
by personal service upon her within Nevada or by her appearance in the
suit.9 Thus the res judicata aspect of the Nevada decree did not extend
to the prior support order.
It seems evident from the quoted statements from the majority opinion
that whether a subsequent ex parte divorce will extinguish a pre-existing
support decree depends entirely upon the public policy of F 1 as expressed
in its statutes and court decisions. What the policy of F 2 may be is immaterial. Such is the conflict of laws rule of the Estin case.
There have been a number of state court decisions subsequent to Estin
which disclose interesting reactions to the permission, granted to the states
by Estin, to adopt their own policies respecting the effect of a subsequent
ex parte divorce upon a pre-existing support decree. It would hardly be
sound to assume that cases decided by state courts prior to the Estin case
are still law, since such decisions were reached without knowledge of what
the Supreme Court, as the final authority on the Full Faith and Credit
.clause, might rule with respect to the effect of that clause on the state's
freedom of choice.
Following Estin, there have been decisions in Oregon 0 and Pennsylvania11 adopting a rule opposite to that of New York. Two Maryland
decisions seem to lean in that direction. 1 2 Arkansas1 3 and New Jersey14
have chosen the New York rule. Florida 15 and Nevada 16 in F2 proceedings
have honored New York policy as expressed in the Estin case. These recent decisions will now be examined in some detail.
The Supreme Court of Oregon has given the problem exhaustive
treatment, as evidenced by the eight page majority opinion and 19 pages
of dissent in the Rodda case. The facts were almost identical with those
of the Estin case. Husband and wife had lived in Oregon. In 1945 the
wife obtained a decree of separate maintenance in Oregon, the decree
including $100 per month for her support. The following year the husband secured an ex parte divorce in Nevada. He then moved in Oregon
to have the separate maintenance decree vacated, on the ground that the
Nevada divorce had extinguished it. In this he was successful. The court
17
characterized the Estin rule as follows:
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 548.
Rodda v. Rodda, 185 Ore. 140, 200 P. 2d 616 (1948), cert. denied, 557 U.S. 946
(1949).
Commonwealth ex rel. McCormack v. McCormack, 164 Pa. 553, 67 A.2d 605 (1949).
Millar v. Millar, 87 A. 2d 838 (Md. 1952); Johnson v. Johnson, 86 A. 2d 520 (Md.
1952).
Rice v. Rice, 213 Ark. 981, 214 S.W.2d 235 (1948).
Brown v. Brown, 88 A. 2d 650 (N.J. 1952).
Kruvand v. Kruvand, 59 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1952).
Summers v. Summers, 241 P. 2d 1097 (Nev. 1952).
Rodda v. Rodda, 185 Ore. 140, 200 P. 2d 616, 619 (1948).
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"But the 'full faith and credit' which Oregon must give to the
Nevada decree does not compel a decision that the separate maintenance decree has been wiped out. That is a question of Oregon
law. Such is the effect of Estin v. Estin."
The heart of the opinion is the statement that: Is
"In short, the marriage relation constitutes the foundation of
the (separate maintenance) order, and, upon the dissolution of
that relation. .

..

it must be held that the order has lost all vitality."

Such a statement sums up the basic reasoning of the cases which adopt
this rule. Here again, it will be noted, the question was raised in F1.
The facts in the McCormack case 19 were substantially the same, with
Pennsylvania in the role of F, and Alabama as F 2. The former husband
obtained a modification in Pennsylvania of his wife's pre-existing support
decree, to eliminate all provisions for her support contained therein. She
was unsuccessful in her attempt to prove that the husband had not gained
a bona fide domicile for divorce purposes in Alabama. The Superior
20
Court of Pennsylvania put in that:

"It is well settled in this Commonwealth that a valid divorce
decree terminates the duty of a husband to support his wife, because of the severance of the marital relationship."
This language is reminiscent of the statement of Pennsylvania law made
by Mr. Justice Douglas in the Estin opinion, and the observation of Mr.
2t
Justice Frankfurter in his dissent, that:

" . . if the respondent had obtained her separate maintenance

decree in Pennsylvania-which treats such decrees as terminated
by any valid divorce, see Esenwein v. Commonwealth ...and had

subsequently moved to New York and there brought a suit based
upon the Pennsylvania decree ...New York would be required to
refer to the law of Pennsylvania to determine whether the maintenance decree of that Commonwealth had survived the Nevada
decree, and, finding that it had not, the New York courts could not
enforce it."

In Millar v. Millar,2 2 husband and wife had lived in Maryland until
the former moved to California and in 1929 obtained an ex parte divorce
there. He later married again, and died in California in 1950. His second
wife sued his first wife in Maryland to partition Maryland realty which had
been owned by H and WI as tenants by the entireties. W2 contended that
the effect of the divorce was to terminate the tenancy by the entireties and
convert it into tenancy in common. The court agreed, observing briefly
that tenancy by the entireties is "founded upon the unity of husband and
wife." Thus the ex parte migratory divorce produced an effect upon the
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

200 P. 2d at 621.
Commonwealth ex rel. McCormack v. McCormack, 164 Pa. 553, 67 A.2d 603 (1949).
67 A. 2d at 604.
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 551.
87 A.2d 838 (Md. 1952).
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economic aspects of the marriage, in addition to severing the marital bonds.

The Johnson case 23 is similar.
Contra to the Oregon and Pennsylvania rule is the Arkansas case of
Rice v. Rice.24 Husband and wife had lived in New York and the wife
had obtained a separate maintenance decree in that State, which ordered
the husband to pay her $15 per week for her support. Mr. Rice moved
to Arkansas in 1945, and the following year obtained an ex parte divorce

in Arkansas, containing no provision for alimony. Thereafter, his former
wife (upon notice to him) had judgment in New York for arrears of
support money and brought suit in Arkansas to enforce the judgment. It
will be noted that in the Rice case the question of survival of the support

decree was presented in F 2, not in F1 as in Estin, Rodda and McCormack.
Holding that by giving notice the wife had avoided the constitutional infirmity which existed in Griffin v. Griffin,2 5 the Supreme Court of Arkan26
sas then stated:
"Under the laws of this State, as announced in the case of
Wagster v. Wagster, 193 Ark. 902, 103 S.W.2d 638, this decree
upon constructive service (the Arkansas divorce) did not destroy
appellee's right to the support money under the decree of another jurisdiction. But this is a question which is governed by
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, and is

concluded by the opinion of that court in the case of Estin v.
Estin ..
"
Then, after copious quotation from the majority opinion in the Estin case,
but without otherwise analyzing New York law, the court concluded 27 that:
the only effect (of the divorce decree) would be to grant
appellant a divorce without discharging the decree of the Supreme
Court of New York requiring him to pay the maintenance allowance. This is the point decided in the Estin case, supra."
It is submitted that although the result was correct, under New York
law, a careful reading of the opinion indicates that the Arkansas court
reached this result by applying Arkansas law, rather than New York law;
and that if such is the case the Supreme Court of Arkansas was incorrect
in resting its decision upon the law of F2 rather than that of F1 . At all
events, the opinion makes it clear that Arkansas is disposed to follow the
New York rule.
New Jersey in Brown v. Brown28 chose the Estin rule. A New Jersey
support decree entered in 1939 had awarded $35 per week to a wife and
three minor children for their support. H obtained a Nevada divorce in
1948, ex parte, and ceased support payments soon thereafter. In the wife's
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Johnson v. Johnson, 86 A. 2d 520 (Md. 1952).
213 Ark. 981, 214 S. W. 2d 235 (1948).
327 U.S. 220 (1946).
214 S.W. 2d at 239.
214 S.W. 2d at 240.
88 A. 2d 650 (N.J. 1952).
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New Jersey action for arrears of weekly payments she prevailed, the court
holding very briefly and without discussion that plaintiff was entitled
to weekly payments of $35 each nothwithstanding the Nevada decree.
Regardless of the domestic policy of F 2 , the courts of that jurisdiction
should, as we have previously observed, follow the law of F, in deciding
whether a subsequent ex parte divorce extinguishes a pior support decree.
3°
This is well illustrated by cases decided in Florida 29 and Nevada during
the current year. In the Kruvand case a New York support decree was
followed by an ex parte Florida divorce. Unlike the Arkansas court, the
Supreme Court of Florida rested its decision squarely upon New York law,
with the opinion writer referring unsympathetically to the husband's legal
strategy3 ' as a:
"shenanigan to shrug off his duty to his wife and children, not
to mention his responsibility to a court that had jurisdiction of
his person and the subject matter of the suit."
The basic facts were the same in Summers v. Summers,3 2 except that
here the husband asked the Nevada court to include in its divorce decree
a provision reducing the amount of support money awarded to the wife by
the New York Court. In denying this relief the Supreme Court of Nevada
observed that New York must recognize that the Nevada divorce severs
the matrimonial bonds, and that:33
"Nevada, contrary to its own policy, must likewise give full faith
and credit to the continuing effect of New York's separate maintenance decree."
2.

WHEN THE DEFENDANT

IS PERSONALLY

SERVED OR APPEARS

IN THE DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS

Mr. Justice Douglas intimated in the Estin opinion 3 4 that if Mrs. Estin
had been personally served in the divorce case, or if she had appeared
therein, her pre-existing support order might have been extinguished by
the divorce decree. Such a result was reached in Lynn v. Lynn, 5 decided
by the New York Court of Appeals in 1951. The Lynns, husband and wife,
lived together in New York from 1926 until sometime prior to 1942, when
she obtained a decree of separation in New York upon grounds of willful
abandonment. The decree provided for an allowance of $85 per week for
her support and that of a minor child. Fifteen months later, Mr. Lynn
sued his wife for divorce in Nevada on grounds of extreme cruelty. She
appeared in the suit, personally and by attorney, unsuccessfully disputed
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Kruvand v. Kruvand, 59 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1952).
Summers v. Summers, 241 P. 2d 1097 (Nev. 1952).
59 So. 2d at 858.
241 P. 2d 1097 (Nev. 1952).
241 P. 2d at 1102.
See note 2, supra.
302 N.Y. 193, 97 N.E. 2d 748 (1951), cert. den. 342 U.S. 849, 72 S. Ct. 72, 96 L.

Ed. 42 (1951).
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his Nevada domicile and resisted on the merits as well. The Nevada court
found cruelty subsequent to the separation decree and gave the husband
a divorce. The decree recited that the wife had made no claim for alimony
or support, but was otherwise silent on that subject. Mr. Lynn returned to
New York and remarried, but continued his $85 a week payments until
his first wife in 1948 applied for an order in the separation proceedings
increasing her weekly payments to $200. In resisting the application, Lynn
contended that the Nevada divorce decree wiped out the former New
York support decree.
The Court of Appeals agreed with his contention. Estin was distinguished on the grounds that the wife's personal appearance in the
Nevada case subjected her to an in personam judgment; that under such
circumstances alimony and support are issues in the case, and that the
failure of the divorce court to make any provision for alimony or support
is equivalent to denying same. Since the wife had in Nevada litigated
the issue of the husband's Nevada domicile, it could not be relitigated in
New York. He was not estopped by his voluntary payments made after the
Nevada decree was rendered. The only ray of hope which the New York
court left to the divorced wife was the possibility that the recitals in the
Nevada decree were equivalent to a reservation of jurisdiction re alimony
and support.
On the main point the Court of Appeals said: 386
"In the present case, however, the Nevada court had jurisdiction of the wife's person by reason of her appearance and consequently, it did have power to determine her right to alimony. If
that tribunal had expressly passed upon the matter of alimony
...there would be no doubt that the Nevada decree would be controlling over the inconsistent provision of the New York judgment.
Since that would be the effect given in Nevada to such a judgment
when rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the wife's person
(citing Nevada cases) the command of the full faith and credit
clause, as implemented by congressional legislation, would require
us to give it like effect in this State. ...
"As long as the court in the divorce action had personal jurisdiction of both parties, its decree ... must be taken to determine
the husband's obligation of support, and the failure to grant
alimony is properly treated as the equivalent of a denial of such
relief .... It follows, then, that the alimony provision of a prior
judgment of separation must yield to the overriding effect of the
divorce decree."
The result of such a case rests squarely upon the res judicata principle;
thus the law of F 2 governs rather than that of F1 as in the case of an ex
parte divorce.
The Lynn situation seems to be occurring in New York with increas36.

97 N.E. 2d at 752.
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ing frequency ,and the lower courts appear to have no difficulty in applying
37
the Lynn rule.
Illinois3 s and Nevada3 9 are in accord with the Lynn rule, and appear to
be the only other jurisdictions which have been confronted with the problem subsequent to the Estin case.
Absent the element of a pre-existing support decree, cases such as
Sherrer v. Sherrer,40 Coe v. Coe,41 and Johnson v. Muelberger,42 tell us
that when the defendant in a divorce case has been personally served within the forum state, or has appeared and participated either personally or
by attorney, the decree is res judicata of all issues which were in fact raised
or could have been raised in the proceeding, including the issue of plaintiff's bona fide domicle in the forum state. Williams 1143 held that in the
absence of such personal service, appearance, or participation, full faith
and credit does not bind a sister state to recognize a divorce decree of the
forum. The Lynn rule is the logical extension of the Sherrer doctrine. In
terms of geometric proportion it may therefore be put that Lynn is to Estin
as Sherrer is to Williams H.
Such is the present state of the law on divisible divorce and subtractable support. The deserted wife who keeps the wolf from the door
with the proceeds of a support decree, and against whom a later ex parte
divorce has been granted, will have troubled sleep o'nights. She must first
determine whether she is still married, within the rule of Williams II. If she
satisfies herself that she is not, then she must determine what is the F,
policy toward the support decree, within the Estin rule. The judge who
hears her case will have his slumbers disturbed, as well, by the disquieting
44
dreams roused up by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissents in Sherrer and Coe,
45
and by the ghost of Mr. Haddock.
37.

38.
39.
40.

41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 92 N.Y.S. 2d 363 (1949); Polk v. Polk, 98 N.Y.S. 2d 36
(1950); Wickett v. Wickett, 98 N.Y.S. 2d 849 (1950); Hettich v. Hettich, 105 N.Y.S.
2d 500 (1951); Ehrenpreis v. Ehrenpreis, 106 N.Y.S. 2d 568 (1951); Marx v. Marx,
106 N.YS. 2d 633 (1951); Correll v. Correll, 109 N.Y.S. 2d 531 (1951); and Marshall
v. Marshall, 113 N.Y.S. 2d 602 (1952). In two cases the wife procured an ex parte
migratory divorce subsequent to a New York support decree. The lower New York
courts held that by so doing she became estopped to assert the prior support decree:
Glennan v. Glennan, 97 N.Y.S. 2d 666 (1950) and (with a strong dissent) McKay
v. McKay, 110 N.Y.S. 2d 82 (1952).
Buck v. Buck, 337 Ill. App. 520, 86 N.E. 2d 415 (1949).
Lagemann v. Lagemann, 65 Nev. 373, 196 P. 2d 1018 (1948).
334 U.S. 343 (1948).

334 U.S. 378 (1948).

340 U.S. 581 (1951). Cf. Cook v. Cook, 72 S. Ct. 157 (1951).
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
See Rodman, The Last of Mr. and Mrs. Haddock? 31 Calif. L. Rev. 167 (1943);
Holt, The Bones of Haddock v. Haddock, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 1013 (1943).

